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Abstract
If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of
expressing nuanced opinions? Say that a ballot is overstating if it is neither
abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots.
The paper shows that when two additive voting rules share the same (up
to an affine transformation) set of overstating ballots, they are strategically
equivalent in large elections. It also characterizes “robust” rules, whose set of
voting equilibria remains unaltered by adding any finite number of ballots: a
rule is robust if and only if it is strategically equivalent to Approval Voting.
These results do not hold for small electorates.
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1 Introduction
Shouting and voting are believed to be activities of a different sort. Whereas the
latter often goes hand in hand with the idea of finding an agreement (democracy
and peace), the former is recurrently associated with the lack of agreement (conflict
and wars). Indeed, to put an end to a dispute, one might suggest to switch from
shouting to voting. However, even if such a distinction seems to be common sense,
both activities have been remarkably close to each other in the past. For instance,
Spartans shouted to elect senators to the Gerousia, Sparta’s Council of Elders.
Each “voter” was allowed to shout as much as he wanted for each of the different
candidates. The candidate who had “the most and loudest” acclamations was elected
senator, see Girard (2010) [11] for an account of the Spartan voting method.
The Spartan shout is close to Evaluative Voting (EV ). Under EV , the voter
evaluates each candidate independently on the same numerical scale; the grades are
added and the candidate with the largest total is elected. Baujard and Igersheim
(2010) [1] report on an experimental work on EV with the scale {0, 1, 2}. This rule,
also called Range Voting, is obviously related to Utilitarianism; see Karni (1998) [13],
Dhillon and Mertens (1999) [8], Segal (2000) [27], d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002)
[6] and Gaertner and Xu (2010) [9] for axiomatic analysis. A related procedure was
in use for several centuries by Venetian oligarchs to elect their Dogi. Instituted in
1268 and used until 1789, the Venetian system allowed voters to express their opinion
about each candidate. A voter was given three balls to indicate approval, disapproval
or dubbio1. Another variation of the Spartan method is simply the modern voting
rule known as Approval Voting (AV ), often advocated for its flexibility since it
emerged in the literature in the mid 70s. Approval Voting2 is Evaluative Voting
with the scale {0, 1}.
Is shouting so different than voting? The previous question can be rephrased
in formal voting theory by asking whether extending the set of ballots available
under a given voting rule modifies the set of voting equilibria? A voting rule V ′ is
an extension of the voting rule V if all the ballots available under V are available
under V ′. For instance, Evaluative Voting (the Spartan shout) is an extension of
AV . Assuming strategic voting, one might suspect that the set of voting equilibria
1The italian dubbio corresponds to the English doubt. According to Lines (1986) [17], this
doubt is roughly equivalent to an abstention as “a doubt vote, if it ever did exist in doge elections,
would essentially be a no vote”.
2There exists a whole literature on AV . See Laslier and Sanver (2010) [16].
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should not be too altered by such an extension. However, this need not be the case for
any extension: a well-known extension is known to modify the set of equilibria in a
convenient manner. Indeed, AV is an extension of Plurality voting (henceforth PV 3)
and, as shown by Myerson and Weber (1993) [21], AV improves the aggregation of
preferences when compared with PV in the noteworthy divided majority situation.
We focus on additive voting rules, in which a ballot is a list of points that the
voter is affording to the candidates, and where points for each candidate are simply
added. (A formal definition of this family of voting rules is provided in the next
section.) We analyze such an issue in the context of strategic voting, that is assuming
that voters strategically cast their votes in order to maximize their (expected) utility
(abstention is allowed). We study equilibria and consider that two voting rules are
strategically equivalent if they have the same equilibrium outcomes.
To study small electorates, we use a standard refinement of Nash equilibrium
and provide examples that show that voters need not overstate at equilibrium.
To tackle the problem on large elections, we focus on the first and simplest model
in this direction, proposed by Myerson and Weber (1993) [21]. In such a model, for
any pair of candidates, the voter considers that there is a positive probability that
her vote is pivotal on this pair, but some of these probabilities are vanishingly small
compared to others. We first define the notion of strategically equivalent voting
rules. Two rules are strategically equivalent whenever there exists an equilibrium
under both of them under which the candidates get the same expected scores (up
to a linear transformation) and the pivot probabilities satisfy the same ordering.
We then derive a sufficient condition for the strategic equivalence of voting rules.
The condition is simple. Say that a ballot is “overstating” if it is not abstention-like
(the ballot does not treat all candidates alike) and if it cannot be expressed as a
mixture of other available ballots. If two voting rules offer the same set of overstating
ballots, up to an affine transformation, then they are strategically equivalent.
The use of this sufficient condition is fairly straightforward, implying several
interesting consequences.
The first consequence is that, in our terms, shouting is voting. The rules used in
two cities lead to the same set of voting equilibria: in other words, Approval Voting
and Evaluative Voting (EV ) are strategically equivalent. The second consequence
3In an election held under PV , a voter is allowed to give at most one point to at most one
candidate. The candidate with the most votes wins the election. The most used rule for presidential
elections is Plurality with a Runoff (Blais (1997) [2]), but we here restrict attention to one-round
voting systems.
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concerns a different family of voting rules in which no restriction is given over how
the grades should be allocated between the different candidates. In an election held
under Cumulative Voting (CV ), a natural extension of Plurality Voting, a voter is
endowed with a finite number of points, and he is allowed to distribute them freely
between the different candidates. Different authors4 have discussed such a method
as it gives a high degree of flexibility to the voter. With such a voting rule, voters
have the possibility of overstating their vote: that is to give the highest possible
amount of points to only one of the candidates. We prove that this is indeed the
case in equilibrium, implying that PV and CV are strategically equivalent. We
hence prove that for both PV and AV , there exist extensions that do not modify
the set of voting equilibria. But, up to now, we have left unaddressed the question of
whether there exists voting rules which set of voting equilibria remains unaltered by
any finite extension; a voting rule satisfying such a definition is robust5. The answer
is positive and surprising. Without loss of generality, we work with normalized rules
in which the maximum score of a candidate in a ballot is 1. We prove that a voting
rule is robust if and only if it is strategically equivalent to AV . To do so, we first show
that AV (or any voting rule that contains all the AV ballots) is robust. The reason
is simple: any normalized ballot can be expressed as a strict convex combination
of AV ballots, and hence our sufficient condition for strategic equivalence applies.
Furthermore, any other normalized voting rule which is extended by adding the
ballots of AV is strategically equivalent to AV . Hence, any robust voting rule must
contain all the AV ballots and hence it is strategically equivalent to AV .
The described equivalence between voting equilibria described is valid along the
lines of the theory of large elections proposed by Myerson and Weber (1993) [21].
Nevertheless, small elections (that is elections with few voters) raise new questions.
For instance, the information available to voters might be much more detailed in
a small election than in a mass election, implying that such theory is of scant
interest in the former case. In order to investigate whether the previous claims still
hold in environments with few voters, we discuss two voting situations in the case
of Evaluative voting. The first example is a pure strategy equilibrium in which
there exists a sequence of trembles a` la Selten (1975) [28] which induce a voter’s
unique best response not to be overstating for any arbitrarily small (even though
4See Sawyer and McRae (1962) [26], Brams (1975) [4], Nitzan (1985) [22], Cox (1990) [5] and
Gerber et. al (1998) [10].
5Robustness requires that the set of electoral outcomes is not modified by allowing voters to
choose from a wider set of ballots.
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positive) perturbation. In the second one, the strategy combination is a mixed-
strategy equilibrium in which the unique pure strategy best response for a voter
is not overstating. Indeed, one of the voters of the election mixes between his
undominated strategies making uncertain the final electoral outcome for the rest of
the voters. The “mixing” removes the weak preference for overstatements. This
situation is stronger that the first one. The situations studied prove that the lack
of overstatement can be a best response even in equilibria that satisfy different
equilibria refinements. The refinement (trembling-hand perfection) used in this work
is among the most classical ways of obtaining equilibria as a limit of games with
uncertainty (i.e. perturbed games). However, it is not too difficult to generalize
the results to settings in which the uncertainty comes from other sources. For
instance, Bayesian games with some uncertainty about voters’ types or common
values’ settings with imperfect information about the true state of nature are good
candidates for models in which overstating is not a best response for a strategic
voter. Finally, we discuss how the set of possible winners in equilibrium is altered
by an extension of the set of ballots. Even though we cannot fully characterize the
set of perfect equilibria (due to the lack of structure of voters’ mistakes) we are able
to show that the equilibria under which “unappealing” candidates win the election
both exist under a voting rule and its extension. In other words, the extension of
the voting rule does not seem to refine the set of possible winners of the election.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basics of the model.
Section 2 to 5 are devoted to large elections: Section 3 describes the equilibrium
concept, Section 4 states the sufficient condition for strategic equivalence, Section
5 presents the strategic equivalence between the above-mentioned voting rules, and
Section 6 contains the results on the robustness of a voting rule. Section 7 presents
the results concerning the environments with few voters, and Section 8 provides
some concluding comments.
2 The setting
There are N voters in the election. Each voter has a type t that determines his
strict preferences over the set of candidates K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. The preferences of a
voter with type t (a t-voter) is denoted by ut = (ut(k))k∈K, in which ut(k) denotes
the utility a t-voter gets if candidate k wins the election. All types t belong to a
finite set of types T . The distribution of types is denoted by r = (r(t))t∈T with∑
t r(t) = 1: in other words, r(t) represents the share of t-voters.
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Within this work, we stick to the comparison of additive rules: a ballot is a
vector b = (b1, b2, . . . , bK) where bk is the number of points given to candidate k, to
be added to elect the candidate with the largest score. Each voter must choose a
ballot b from a finite set of possible ballots denoted by B.
For instance, in an election held under Plurality Voting (PV ) voters can abstain
or give one point to at most one candidate. Formally:
BPV = {Any permutation of (1, 0, . . . , 0)} ∪ {0, 0, ..., 0)}.
Similarly, an Approval Voting (AV ) ballot consists of a vector that lists whether
each candidate has been approved or not: for each j ∈ K , bj ∈ {0, 1}. Hence:
BAV = {0, 1}K.
Definition 1. A voting rule V is an extension of the voting rule V ′ if all ballots in
V ′ are available in V , i.e.
BV ′ ⊂ BV .
For instance, Approval Voting is an extension of Plurality Voting as BPV ⊂ BAV .
3 Large Elections
We assume that each voter maximizes his expected utility to determine which ballot
in the set B he will cast. In this model, his vote has an impact in his payoff if
it changes the winner of the election. Therefore, a voter needs to estimate the
probability of these situations: the pivot outcomes. We say that two candidates are
tied if their vote totals are equal. Furthermore, let H denote the set of all unordered
pairs of candidates. We denote a pair {i, j} in H as ij with ij = ji.
For each pair of candidates i and j, the ij-pivot probability pij is the probability
of the outcome perceived by the voters that candidates i and j will be tied for first
place in the election. A voter perceives that the probability that he will change the
winner of the election from candidate i to candidate j by casting ballot b with bi ≥ bj
to be linearly proportional to bi − bj, and that the constant of proportionality (the
ij-pivot probability) is the same for the perceived chance of changing the winner
from j to i if bj ≥ bi 6.
6This is roughly equivalent to assume that the probability of candidates i and j being tied for
first place is the same as the probability of candidate i being in first place one vote ahead candidate
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A vector listing the pivot probabilities for all pairs of candidates is denoted by
p = (pij)ij∈H . This vector p is assumed to be identical and common knowledge
for all voters in the election. A voter with ij-pivot probability pij anticipates that
submitting the ballot b can change the winner of the election from candidate j to
candidate i to be pij max{bi − bj, 0}.
Let Et[b] denote the expected utility gain of a t-voter from casting ballot b when
p is the common vector of pivot probabilities:
Et[b] =
∑
ij∈H
(bi − bj) · pij · [ut(i)− ut(j)]. (1)
The expected utility gain from casting ballot b equals the expected utility of
casting ballot b minus the expected utility of abstaining. Focusing on utility gains
simplifies notation.
A (voting) strategy is a probability distribution σ over the set B that summarizes
the voting behavior of voters of each type. For any ballot b and any type t, σ(b | t)
is the probability that a t-voter casts ballot b. Therefore,
τ(b) =
∑
t∈T
r(t)σ(b | t)
is the share of the electorate who cast ballot b. Hence, the (expected) score of
candidate k is
S(k) =
∑
b∈B
bkτ(b).
The set of likely winners of the election contains the candidates whose expected
score S(k) is maximal given the strategy σ.
Myerson and Weber (1993) [21] assume that voters expect candidates with lower
expected scores to be less likely serious contenders for first place than candidates
with higher expected scores. In other words, if the expected score for some candidate
l is strictly higher than the expected score for some candidate k, then the voters
would perceive that candidate l’s being tied with any third candidate m is much
more likely than candidate k’s being tied for first place with candidate m7.
j (and both candidates above the rest of the candidates), which is in turn the same one as the
probability of candidate j being in first place one vote ahead candidate i. Myerson and Weber
(1993) [21] justify this assumption by arguing that it seems reasonable when the electorate is large
enough. This is not verified in Poisson games, a formal model of large elections in which the pivot
probabilities are derived endogenously from the structure of the game.
7This assumption is needed in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium. The results presented
here do not lie on the ordering of the pivot probabilities.
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Definition 2. Given a (voting) strategy σ and any 0 < ε < 1, a pivot probability
vector p satisfies the ordering condition for ε (with respect to σ) if, for every three
distinct candidates i, j and k:
S(i) > S(j) =⇒ pjk ≤ εpik.
Besides, Myerson and Weber (1993) [21] assume that the probability of three
(or more) candidates being tied for first place is infinitesimal in comparison to the
probability of a two-candidate tie.
Definition 3. The strategy σ is a (voting) equilibrium of the game if and only if,
for every positive number ε, there exists some vector p of positive pivot probabilities
that satisfies the ordering condition and such that, for each ballot b and for each type
t,
σ(b | t) > 0 =⇒ b ∈ arg max
d∈B
Et[d].
It should be stressed that, in this definition, the pivot probabilities pij are sup-
posed to be constant when the voter contemplates casting one ballot or the other.
This point will play an important role in the next section. It is justified when the
number of voters is large for, in that case, the voter cannot change with his single
vote the order of magnitude of these probabilities. It can be shown that the set of
equilibria is non-empty8.
Finally, an important concept in our model should be defined: the equivalence
between equilibria under different voting rules.
Definition 4. An equilibrium σU of an election held under a voting rule U is equiv-
alent to an equilibrium σV of the same election held under V if and only if
1. the pivot probabilities satisfy the same ordering and
2. the scores of the candidates coincide, up to an affine transformation.
The sets of voting equilibria of an election held under two voting rules U and V
are equivalent if for any voting equilibrium of the election held under U (resp. V ),
there exists an equivalent voting equilibrium of the election held under V (resp. U)
Definition 5. Two voting rules are strategically equivalent if and only if their set
of voting equilibria are equivalent.
8See Theorem 1, page 105 in Myerson and Weber (1993) [21].
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We will pay special attention to the set of possible winners WV that arise under a
voting rule V . A possible winner is a candidate who wins the election in equilibrium
with positive probability. The set of possible winners of an election held under the
voting rule V is
WV = {k ∈ K | There exists an equilibrium σ in which S(k) is maximal}.
If two voting rules are strategically equivalent, then they have the same set
of possible winners. However, the converse need not be true; for instance, the
rankings of other candidates may differ. It is noteworthy that the definition of
strategic equivalence used is rather demanding. It requires more than the set of
possible winners being the same under two voting rules. This demanding definition
reinforces our results as we show that this strong version of equivalence holds in the
Myerson-Weber setting.
4 A sufficient condition for strategic equivalence
We now introduce some categorizations of the ballots that will be useful throughout.
An abstention ballot is a ballot with all the coordinates alike ; the set of such
ballots is denoted by Abs(B).
An interior ballot b is a ballot which is not an abstention ballot and that can
be expressed as a strict convex combination of other ballots in B, i.e. there exist
ballots
b1, b2, . . . , bm ∈ B with b =
∑
i
αib
i with αi ∈ (0, 1) and
∑
i
αi = 1.
An overstating ballot is a ballot which is neither an interior nor an abstention
ballot. Given the set of ballots B, the set of interior and overstating ballots are
respectively denoted by Int(B) and Ove(B) with,
Ove(B) = B \ {Int(B) ∪ Abs(B)}.
Remark 1.
Casting an abstention ballot or a ballot which is a convex combination of at least
one abstention ballot is dominated for every voter.
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To see this, let bj denote an abstention ballot with bj = (x, . . . , x). By formula
(1), E[bj] =
∑
ij∈H(x − x) · pij · [ut(i) − ut(j)] = 0 so that any abstention ballot is
dominated. Let c =
∑
i αib
i denote the convex combination of at least one abstention
ballot so that Et[c] =
∑
i 6=j αiEt[b
i] as Et[b
j] = 0. If Et[c] ≤ 0, then casting ballot c
is dominated. If Et[c] > 0, then
∑
i 6=j αiEt[b
i] > 0 so that there must exist bi with
i 6= j with Et[bi] > 0. Then, casting ballot c is dominated by the mixed strategy
that casts ballot c with probability 1− αj and ballot bi with probability αj.
In other words, neither an abstention ballot nor a ballot which is a convex com-
bination of at least one abstention ballot are cast with positive probability in equi-
librium.
Remark 2.
The definition of interior ballot implies that if a ballot c is interior then it is the
strict convex combination of overstating and abstention ballots:
c =
∑
b∈B′
αb · b for someB′withB′ ⊂ Ove(B)∪Abs(B)withαb ∈ (0, 1)and
∑
b∈B′
αb = 1.
Remark 3.
The ballot set B is finite and hence not every ballot can be expressed by a convex
combination of other ballots in B.
Remark 4.
The set Ove(B) of overstating ballots is non-empty for any non-trivial voting
rule. To see this, let us suppose that Ove(B) = ∅ for some voting rule with ballot
set B. By definition, B = Ove(B)∪Int(B)∪Abs(B). By Remark 3, not every ballot
can be expressed by a convex combination of other ballots in B, so that B 6= Int(B).
As we have assumed that Ove(B) = ∅, we must have that Abs(B) 6= ∅, i.e. every
ballot which is not interior is an abstention ballot. Hence, every ballot of such a
rule is an abstention ballot as any interior ballot is a strict convex combination of
other ballots. Thus, such a voting rule can be labeled as trivial as it elects for any
preference profile the whole set of candidates.
Example 1.
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Let us consider a three-candidates election held under Cumulative Voting. We
assume that a voter is endowed with at most two points that can be freely distributed
among the different candidates. The set of allowed ballots BCV is:
BCV = {(0, 0, 0),(2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 2),
(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}.
The interior ballots are the following ones:
Int(BCV ) = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)},
whereas there is a unique abstention ballot:
Abs(BCV ) = {(0, 0, 0)}.
(To see why, it is enough to write that for instance the interior ballot (1, 1, 0) equals
the convex combination 1/2(2, 0, 0) + 1/2(0, 2, 0).) Finally, the set of overstating
ballots is:
Ove(BCV ) = {(2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 2)}.
4.1 Overstating
By Remark 1, an abstention ballot is not cast with positive probability in equilibrium
so that there are two types of equilibria: interior and overstating. We refer to an
interior equilibrium whenever a voter’s best response includes an interior ballot. On
the contrary, an overstating equilibrium is an equilibrium in which every voter’s best
response uniquely includes overstating ballots.
Proposition 1. [Overstating] For any interior equilibrium, there exists an equiva-
lent overstating equilibrium.
Proof. Let σ be an interior equilibrium such that some t-voter’s best response satis-
fies σ(c | t) = 1 with c an interior ballot. Therefore we can write c =∑b∈B′ αb · b for
some subset B′ of the set of overstating ballots as c is cast with positive probability
at equilibrium (Remarks 1 and 2).
Formula (1) implies that
Et[c] = Et[
∑
b∈B′
αb · b] =
∑
b∈B′
αb · Et[b].
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In other words, the t-voter is indifferent between casting ballot c and playing a mixed
strategy over the set B′ which mimics the convex combination that defines ballot c.
Formally, the voter t is indifferent between strategy σ as defined9 and strategy σ∗
with {
σ∗(b | t) = αb for all b ∈ B′ and
σ∗(·| t′) = σ(·| t′) for voters with type t′ 6= t.
Besides, for every ε > 0, the pivot probability vector p that justifies the strategy
σ also justifies the strategy σ∗ as the scores of candidates coincide under both
strategies, implying that σ∗ is an equilibrium.
All in all, both σ and σ∗ are justified by the same pivot probability vector and
under both of them, the expected scores of the candidates coincide. Hence, for any
interior equilibrium σ, there exists an equivalent overstating equilibrium σ∗.
4.2 Strategic equivalence
Proposition 1 proves that interior equilibria are not informative in the sense that
they do not add any information regarding the equilibria that can be attained under
a voting rule. Building on such a result, we now give a simple sufficient condition to
ensure the strategic equivalence of two voting rules. Indeed, we show that if there
exists a bijective affine transformation between the overstating ballots of two voting
rules, then both rules are strategically equivalent.
Theorem 1. Whenever there exists a bijective affine transformation between the
overstating ballots Ove(BU) and Ove(BV ) of two voting rules U and V , U and V
are strategically equivalent.
Proof. Let U and V denote two voting rules such that there exists a bijective affine
transformation f : b 7−→ f(b) = α + β · b, from Ove(BU) onto Ove(BV ), for some
reals α and β.
Let σ be a strategy in an election held under U in which every voter only casts
ballots in the set Ove(BU). Let σ
∗ denote a strategy in the same election held under
V that satisfies
σ∗(b∗ | t) = σ(b | t), (2)
in which each ballot b∗ satisfies b∗ = f(b) = α + βb.
9Throughout the proof, t-voters play in pure strategies in the equilibrium σ. Similar arguments
can be used to extend the proof whenever σ involves that some t-voters play in mixed strategies.
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Let us now prove that the strategy σ is an overstating equilibrium of the election
held under U if and only if the strategy σ∗ is an overstating equilibrium of the
election held under V with both σ and σ∗ being equivalent.
First of all, an equilibrium is overstating if and only if the unique ballots that
are cast with positive probability are overstating. Thus, if we show that σ and σ∗
are equilibria under U and V respectively, then both equilibria will be overstating.
Let us now prove that casting ballot b is a best response given σ if and only if
casting ballot b∗ is a best response given σ∗:
b ∈ arg max
d∈Ove(BU )
Et[d]⇐⇒ Et[b] ≥ Et[d] ∀ d ∈ Ove(BU)
⇐⇒ α + βEt[b] ≥ α + βEt[d] ∀ d ∈ Ove(BU)
⇐⇒ Et[b∗] ≥ Et[d∗] ∀ d∗ ∈ Ove(BV )
⇐⇒ b∗ ∈ arg max
d∗∈Ove(BV )
Et[d
∗].
Besides, given that the strategy σ∗ satisfies (2), the scores of the candidates S(·)
given σ and S∗(·) given σ∗ satisfy
S∗(k) = α + βS(k) ∀ k ∈ K,
and whence the scores of candidates coincide up to an affine transformation under
both strategies.
In order to prove the equivalence between σ and σ∗, it remains to be checked
that pivot probabilities satisfy the same ordering with both strategies σ and σ∗.
However, as the scores of candidates coincide up to an affine transformation with
both strategies, a pivot probabilities vector p satisfies the ordering condition under
σ if and only if it satisfies the ordering condition under σ∗.
We have proved so far that σ is an overstating equilibrium under U if and only
if there exists an equivalent overstating equilibrium σ∗ under V . In other words,
if there exists a bijective affine transformation between Ove(BU) and Ove(BV ), the
set of overstating equilibria under both U and V are equivalent. But the previous
equivalence finishes the proof as by Proposition 1, any interior equilibrium under a
voting rule is equivalent to an overstating equilibrium under the same voting rule.
Theorem 1 has the advantage of being extremely simple to use: indeed, as will
be shown the next section, almost no computation is needed to check the strategic
equivalence of two voting rules.
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5 Applications
Two applications of Theorem 1 are now described. The main interest of such a
theorem is that it allows to “simplify” voting rules, in which the term simplify has
been coined by the recent literature on mechanism simplification10. In this literature,
a mechanism is simplified by reducing the message space of the agents, while no new
equilibria are created as a consequence of this reduction. When the number of voters
becomes large enough, adding or removing interior ballots to a voting rule does not
modify the set of voting equilibria. Our results hence prove that when the number
of voters is large enough, many voting rules can be simplified.
5.1 Evaluative Voting: One man, Many extended votes
An AV ballot consists of a vector that lists whether each candidate has been ap-
proved or not: ∀j ∈ K, bj ∈ {0, 1}. Hence it is simple to see that Abs(BAV ) =
{(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}.
Under Evaluative Voting, a voter can assign up to m points to each candidate
for some positive m. Hence,
b is an EV ballot if ∀ j ∈ K, bj ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m},
with abstention ballots Abs(BEV ) = {(0, . . . , 0), (m, . . . ,m)}.
Theorem 2. EV and AV are strategically equivalent.
Proof. The set of overstating ballots of AV satisfies
Ove(BAV ) = {0, 1}K \ {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)},
and the set of overstating ballots of EV equals
Ove(BEV ) = {0,m}K \ {(0, . . . , 0), (m, . . . ,m)},
so that, by Theorem 1, EV and AV are strategically equivalent.
5.2 Cumulative Voting: One man, One extended vote
In an election held under PV , voters can give one point to at most one candidate.
Formally, we say that b is a PV ballot if for every j ∈ K, bj ∈ {0, 1} and there is at
most one bj 6= 0.
10See Milgrom (2009, 2010) [18, 19] and Perez-Richet (2011) [25].
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In an election held under Cumulative Voting, a voter can assign up to m points
to each candidate for some positive m with the restriction that the sum of the points
he can assign to each of the candidates is at most m. Hence,
BCV =
{
bj ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} ∀ j ∈ K and
∑
k∈K
bk ≤ m
}
.
Theorem 3. CV and PV are strategically equivalent.
Proof. Given the set of ballots under PV and CV , one obtains that
Ove(BPV ) = {Any permutation of (1, 0, . . . , 0)}.
and that
Ove(BCV ) = {Any permutation of (m, 0, . . . , 0)}.
which, by Theorem 1, concludes the proof.
6 Robust Voting rules
Within this section, we introduce the notion of robust voting rule and show that a
voting rule is robust if and only if it is strategically equivalent to AV .
Definition 6. A voting rule V is robust if any extension of V is strategically equiv-
alent to V .
Robustness requires that the set of electoral outcomes is not modified by allowing
voters to choose from a wider set of ballots.
A voting rule is normalized if the maximum score of a candidate in a ballot is
1. Remark that any ballot of a normalized rule can be expressed as the mixture
(convex combination) of AV ballots. Hence, for any normalized voting rule V which
extends AV , we have
Ove(BAV ) = Ove(BV ),
implying, by Theorem 1, the strategic equivalence of V and AV as summarized by
the next result. Furthermore, extending any voting rule V by “adding” the AV
ballots modifies the set of overstating ballots and hence leads to a voting rule which
is strategically equivalent to AV . We hence can state without proof the following
characterization of robust voting rules.
Theorem 4. A voting rule is robust if and only if it is strategically equivalent to
AV .
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7 Small Elections
The results previously presented are a consequence of the model used in which
voters’ perceptions over the impact of their ballots in switching the winner of the
election have a very specific shape. Such a theory fits particularly well the study
of mass elections. Indeed, as shown by further developments of the theory11, more
formal models give, roughly speaking, similar predictions depending on whether the
ordering condition is satisfied. However, it seems that the specific shape of expected
utility is not particularly relevant for studying voting in committees (that is voting
with few voters). Indeed, in a committee, the information a voter knows can be
much more detailed than in a large election.
When switching to an environment with few voters, we prove two results:
• Not overstating might be the unique best response for a strategic voter.
• The set of winners of an election is not significantly altered by allowing voters
to express an intensity of preference.
7.1 Overstating need not be optimal
In order to prove that not overstating may be a unique best response in a voting game
with few voters, we present two examples. The first one presents a pure strategy
equilibrium whereas the second one is a mixed strategy one. In order to test the
robustness of the examples, we focus on trembling-hand perfection a` la Selten. The
definition of perfection is as follows:
Definition 7. A completely mixed strategy profile σεN is an ε-perfect equilibrium in
an N -voters game if
∀i ∈ N , ∀bi, b¯i ∈ B, if Ui(bi, σεN\{i}) > Ui(b¯i, σεN\{i}), with σε(b¯i) ≤ ε,
in which Ui(b) denotes the payoff of voter i given the strategy combination b. We
refer to the strategy combination σN as a perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence
{σεN} of ε-perfect equilibria converging (for ε→ 0) to σN .
11See Myerson (2002) [20], Laslier (2009) [15], Nu´n˜ez (2009) [24], Bouton and Castanheira (2010)
[3], Goertz and Maniquet (2010) [12], and Nun˜ez (2010) [23].
16
Example 1:
There are three candidates K = {1, 2, 3} and three different types T = {a, b, c},
with cardinal utilities given by:
ua = (3, 1, 0), ub = (0, 3, 1) and uc = (0, 1, 3).
There are seven voters in the electorate. Voters 1 and 2 have type a, voters 3 and
4 have type b and voters 5, 6 and 7 have type c.
We consider Evaluative Voting in which voters can give up to two points to each
of the candidates.
We let f denote the strategy combination with
f = ((2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 1), (0, 0, 2), (0, 0, 2), (0, 0, 2)).
It is simple to see that voters 3 and 4 do not overstate. Besides, f is an equi-
librium in undominated strategies in which candidate 3 wins the election by more
than two votes.
Proposition 2. In Example 1, f is a perfect equilibrium in which some voters’ best
responses are not overstating.
This proposition, the proof of which is included in the appendix, shows that not
overstating might be a voter’s best response in a perfect equilibrium. Indeed, a
perfect equilibrium is the limit of completely mixed strategies of the voters that
arise as a consequence of uncorrelated mistakes of the voters. Hence, voters’ expected
utility is not anymore “smooth” as it is by assumption in the large elections model.
Example 2:
There are three candidates K = {1, 2, 3} and four different types T = {a, b, c, d},
with cardinal utilities given by:
ua = (6, 1, 0), ub = (0, 6, 1), uc = (0, 1, 6) and ud = (0, 3, 6).
There are seven voters in the electorate. Voters 1,2 and 3 have type a, voters 4 and
5 have type b, voter 6 has type c and voter 7 has type d .
We consider Evaluative Voting in which voters can give up to two points to each
of the candidates.
We let g denote the strategy combination
g = ((2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 1), (0, 0, 2), g7).
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in which g7 stands for the mixed strategy 1/3(0, 0, 2) + 1/3(0, 1, 2) + (1/3)(0, 2, 2)
of voter 7. Every voter plays an undominated strategy in the strategy combination
g. It is easy to check that g is a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the election in which
voters 1 to 6 are playing a unique best response.
Proposition 3. In Example 2, g is a perfect equilibrium in which some voters’
unique best responses are not overstating.
Remark 1: The source of the non overstating behavior in the second example is
clearly the uncertainty faced by voters 4 and 5, as a consequence of the mixing of
voter 7. The same logic applies in a (Bayesian) game of incomplete information in
which voters are not sure of the type of their opponents.
Remark 2: The utility vectors in both examples are consistent with single-peaked
preferences.
7.2 Possible Winners remain unchanged
We now address the issue of the set of possible winners in an election with a small
number of voters. To do so, we give a proposition which extends a previous result
of De Sinopoli (2000) [7] (which focused in Plurality Voting). We show that any
candidate who is not a Condorcet loser can win the election under Plurality Voting
and Cumulative Voting.
Prior to stating it, we need the definition of Condorcet loser.
Definition 8. Candidate k’ is a Condorcet loser if
#{i ∈ N | ui(k) > ui(k′)} > #{i ∈ N | ui(k′) > ui(k)} ∀ k ∈ K \ k′.
Proposition 4. In an election held under either PV or CV with at least 4 voters,
for every candidate k who is not a Condorcet loser there exists a perfect equilibrium
in which k wins the election.
Proof. Let 1 and 2 be two candidates who are not Condorcet losers. Let us divide the
voters in two groups: the voters who prefer candidate 1 to candidate 2, V (1, 2) =
{i ∈ N | ui(1) > ui(2)}, and the remaining ones V (2, 1) = {i ∈ N | ui(2) >
ui(1)}. Under CV , a voter can assign up to m points to a single candidate. Under
PV , the proof remains unchanged with the constraint that m = 1. Consider the
mixed strategy dε such that for every voter i ∈ V (1, 2), where ηi denotes the mixed
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strategy of voter that assigns equal probability to all his pure strategies with obvious
notations,
dεi = (1− ε− ε2)(m, 0, . . . , 0) + ε(0,m, 0 . . . , 0) + ε2ηi,
and such that for every voter i ∈ V (2, 1),
dεi = (1− ε− ε2)(0,m, . . . , 0) + ε(m, 0, 0 . . . , 0) + ε2ηi.
For each voter, the pivot event which becomes infinitely more likely as ε tends
towards zero is one in which candidates 1 and 2 are involved.1 Hence, each voter
plays his best response with probability higher than ε in the sequence of mixed
strategies dε. Besides, as ε approaches zero, every voter in the set V (1, 2) votes for
candidate 1, and every other voter votes for candidate 2, which implies that either
candidate 1 or candidate 2 wins the election, proving the claim.
The previous result implies that extending the set of available grades in the case
of PV does not refine in a relevant way the set of possible winners of elections with
few voters.
The reason why the equilibrium depicted by the Proposition 4 can be constructed
is simple. For any pair of candidates 1 and 2 (who are not Condorcet losers), we
split the electorate in two blocs: the ones who prefer candidate 1 to candidate 2 (the
partisans of candidate 1) and the ones who prefer candidate 2 to candidate 1 (the
partisans of candidate 2). Let us assume that partisans of candidate 1 assign her
the maximum number of points whereas partisans of candidate 2 behave in the same
manner with respect to candidate 2. Each of the two blocs is homogenous in the
sense that each voter makes the same mistakes. Hence, when casting his ballot, a
voter knows almost surely that, provided being pivotal, his vote will break the close
race between candidates 1 and 2. Therefore, it is a best response for the partisans
of a candidate to assign her the maximum number of points, proving that this is an
equilibrium. Both voting rules analyzed in the Proposition 4 share the feature that
a voter can assign the total number of points to a single candidate, leading to the
construction of this “almost-everything-can-happen” type of result.
The Majority Preferred Candidate In order to conclude our investigation in
the case of a reduced number of voters, we focus on the majority preferred candidate
situation, in a similar spirit to the one depicted by Nun˜ez (2010) [23]. Let us consider
a voting game held under Evaluative Voting. There are three types of voters in the
electorate:
ua = (3, 0, 1), ub = (1, 3, 0) and uc = (1, 0, 3),
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with voters 1,2 being of type a, voters 3 to 7 being of type b and voters 8 to 10 of
the third type. We will refer to candidate 2 as the majority preferred candidate as
5 voters over 10 rank him first. Candidate 1 is only ranked as a first option by two
over ten voters in the election but it can nevertheless be elected at equilibrium in
elections held under EV and AV as shown by next result.
Proposition 5. There exists a perfect equilibrium in which candidate 1 is the unique
winner of the election held under both EV and AV.
Proof. Under EV , a voter can assign up to m points to a single candidate. Consider
the mixed strategy eε where ηi denotes the mixed strategy of a voter that assigns
equal probability to all his pure strategies,
eεi = (1− ε− ε2)(m, 0, 0) + ε2ηi with i = 1, 2
eεi = (1− ε− ε2)(m,m, 0) + ε(0, 0,m) + ε2ηi with i = 3, . . . , 7,
eεi = (1− ε− ε2)(0, 0,m) + ε2ηi with i = 8, . . . , 10.
For each voter i = 1, 2, the pivot event which becomes infinitely more likely
as ε tends towards zero is (4m, 3m, 5m) so that it is a strict best response to vote
only for his first-ranked candidate. Similarly, for each voter i = 3, . . . , 7, the pivot
event which becomes infinitely more likely as ε tends towards zero is (4m, 2m, 5m)
so that it is a strict best response to vote for his first-ranked and his second-ranked
candidate. Finally, the event that determines voters i = 8, 9, 10’s best responses
is (5m, 3m, 4m) and hence their unique best response is to cast ballot (0, 0,m).
Besides, as ε approaches zero, candidate 1 wins the election as every voter who
votes for candidate 2 also votes for candidate 1, proving the claim.
The bottom-line of this example is that even if we do not provide a character-
ization of possible winners under Evaluative Voting, enlarging the set of possible
grades does not remove the coordination problems already present under Approval
Voting. Hence, one can intuitively think that the set of possible winners should
not be too refined by EV (when compared to AV ), if at all. Similar coordination
problems as the ones illustrated by Proposition 5 have been already identified by
Nun˜ez (2010) [23] in the case of AV . The logic of this unattractive equilibrium
boils down to voters’ anticipations. In a certain manner, AV performs better than
PV in preference aggregation as, with the former voting rule the voter does not
face the classical trade-off between voting for his preferred candidate and voting for
his preferred likely winner (the wasted-vote effect). However, this property of AV
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(and of EV ) may not be enough to ensure a correct preference aggregation in every
election. If the majority of voters anticipate that their preferred candidate is not
included in the most probable pivot outcome, this may lead to the election of an
unappealing candidate. Indeed, due to their anticipations, the majority of voters
favors their preferred likely winner by assigning her the maximum number of points
and at the same time vote for their preferred candidate, leading to the election of
the former candidate.
8 Conclusion
Building on the theory of strategic voting in large elections, we have derived a
sufficient condition for the strategic equivalence of voting rules that simply depends
on the ballots available to the voters. The condition says that whenever two voting
rules share the same set of overstating ballots (up to an affine transformation), then
they are strategically equivalent. Hence, such a condition helps us to draw some
conclusions over how adding ballots to a given voting rule modifies the set of voting
equilibria. First, we prove that it is possible to add ballots to both Plurality Voting
and Approval Voting without modifying the set of voting equilibria. In the case
of Approval voting, there is no difference between shouting (the Spartan Shout)
and voting (AV ) when voters act strategically. As far as Plurality voting (PV )
is concerned, Cumulative voting extends PV while being strategically equivalent
to PV . We then characterize robust voting rules, voting rules which set of voting
equilibria is not modified by adding any finite number of ballots. We show that
any robust voting rule is strategically equivalent to AV . As has been shown, the
previous results do not extend to a context with a reduced number of voters.
We have very few observations to back up, or to invalidate, these theoretical
results. Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004) [14] report on an experiment comparing
EV with the 0 to 10 scale and AV, and Baujard and Igersheim (2010) [1] report on an
experiment comparing EV with the 0-1-2 scale and AV. In both cases it is observed
that the outcome of the election (the elected candidate) is the same under the two
systems, even if it is not observed that voters concentrate on extreme grades.
An interesting extension of the present work would be to understand whether
similar results apply under proportional representation or in multi-seat elections in
which voters have to distribute their votes. Finally, it is noteworthy to underline that
our sufficient condition for strategic equivalence remains silent over the different rank
scoring rules as characterized by Young (1975) [30]. Indeed, there are no interior
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ballots in a rank scoring rule and the different scoring rules do not share the same
set of overstating ballots.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
In an election held under Evaluative Voting in which voters can give up to two points
to each of the three candidates, voters have three undominated strategies: to give
two points to their favorite candidate, no points to their least preferred candidate and
zero, one or two points to their middle ranked candidate. The previous observation is
important, as in a perfect equilibrium voters only choose undominated strategies12.
It is easy to see that the strategy combination
f = ((2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 1), (0, 0, 2), (0, 0, 2), (0, 0, 2))
is an undominated equilibrium in which b-voters do not overstate and in which
candidate 3 wins the election. Consider the following completely mixed strategy
combination f ε, where ηi denotes the mixed strategy of voter i which assigns equal
probability to all his pure strategies.
i = 1,2 f εi = (1− 27ε2)(2, 0, 0) + 27ε2ηi
i = 3,4 f εi = (1− 27ε2)(0, 2, 1) + 27ε2ηi
i = 5,6,7 f εi = (1− ε1 − ε2 − 25ε2)(0, 0, 2) + (ε1 − ε2)(2, 0, 0) + (ε2 − ε2)(2, 2, 0) + 25ε2ηi,
in which ε1 = 1/3(ε+ ε
2) and ε2 = 1/3(2ε− ε2).
It is easy to see that, for ε sufficiently close to zero, this is an ε-perfect equilib-
rium. Suppose all voters other than i choose the strategies prescribed by f . Then,
12See Corollary 2.2.6, page 29 in van Damme (1996) [29].
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the three undominated strategies of voter i are equivalent. Since for ε going to zero,
the probability of voter 5 (the same statement is valid for voters 6 or 7) to tremble
towards (2, 0, 2) or (2, 2, 0) is infinitely greater than the probability of any other
mistake, due to the trembling of one or several voters, it is enough to check that
in both of these events the limiting strategy is preferred to the other undominated
strategy.
For voters 1 and 2, the relevant contingencies which allow them to discriminate
between their three undominated strategies is when the behavior of the others is
summarized by the vectors (4, 4, 6) and (4, 6, 6). Let us denote their probabilities
given voter’s best responses by p((4, 4, 6) | f ε−i) and p((4, 6, 6) | f ε−i). Furthermore,
given voter’s best responses, we can write that 2p((4, 4, 6) | f ε−i) = p((4, 6, 6) | f ε−i).
Since
U1(2, 0, 0) = 3/2 p((4, 4, 6) | f ε−i) + 4/3 p((4, 6, 6) | f ε−i)
= 25/12 p((4, 6, 6) | f ε−i)
> U1(2, 1, 0), U1(2, 2, 0).
Hence, (2,0,0) is the best reply to f ε−i. The same statement is true for voter 2.
For voters 3 and 4, the relevant contingencies can be summarized by the vec-
tors (6, 2, 5) and (6, 4, 5). Let us denote their probabilities by p((6, 2, 5) | f ε−i)
and p((6, 4, 5) | f ε−i). Furthermore, given voter’s best responses, we can write that
2p((6, 2, 5) | f ε−i) = p((6, 4, 5) | f ε−i). Since
U3(0, 2, 1) = 1/2 p((6, 2, 5) | f ε−i) + 4/3 p((6, 4, 5) |f ε−i)
= 19/12 p((6, 4, 5) | f ε−i)
> U3(0, 2, 0) = U3(0, 2, 2).
the non-overstating strategy is the best reply to f ε−i. The same statement applies
for voter 4.
Similarly, one can deduce that for voters i = 5,6,7 casting ballot (0,0,2) is a
best response against f ε. Indeed, for voters 5, 6 and 7, the relevant contingencies
are summarized by the vectors (6, 4, 4) and (6, 6, 4). Let us denote their probabilities
by p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i) and p((6, 6, 4) | f ε−i). Furthermore, given voter’s best responses,
we can write that 2p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i] = p((6, 6, 4) | f ε−i). Since
U5(0, 0, 2) = 3/2 p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i) + 4/3 p((6, 6, 4) |f ε−i)
= 25/12 p((6, 6, 4) | f ε−i)
> U5(0, 1, 2), U5(0, 2, 2).
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the non-overstating strategy is the best reply to f ε−i and similarly for voters 6 and
7.
Hence, {f ε} is a sequence of ε-perfect equilibria. Since f is the limit of f ε, it is
a perfect equilibrium in which voters’ best responses are not overstating.
B Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
The first step of the proof consists in showing that g is a mixed strategy equilib-
rium. To do so, we compute the probability, under g, of each pivot outcome a
player can face and, from these probabilities, the expected utility derived from each
undominated strategy.
Voters 1,2,3
Even though the best responses are explained for the voter 1, the reasoning is
analogous for voters 2 and 3.
p((4, 4, 6) | g−1) = 1/3
p((4, 5, 6) | g−1) = 1/3
p((4, 6, 6) | g−1) = 1/3.
From the pivot probabilities previously described, we have
U1(2, 0, 0) = 25/9
U1(2, 1, 0) = 19/9
U1(2, 2, 0) = 13/9.
which entails that (2, 0, 0) is the unique best response for voter 1.
Voters 4,5
Voter 4’s best responses are analyzed, the reasoning being analogous for the
voter 5.
p((6, 2, 5) | g−4) = 1/3
p((6, 3, 5) | g−4) = 1/3
p((6, 4, 5) | g−4) = 1/3.
From the pivot probabilities previously described, we have
U4(0, 2, 0) = 1
U4(0, 2, 1) = 10/9
U4(0, 2, 2) = 1.
implying that (0, 2, 1) is the unique best response for voter 4.
Voter 6
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The most probable pivot outcomes faced by voter 6 are as follows
p((6, 4, 4) | g−6) = 1/3
p((6, 5, 4) | g−6) = 1/3
p((6, 6, 4) | g−6) = 1/3
From the pivot probabilities previously described, we have
U6(0, 0, 2) = 25/9
U6(0, 1, 2) = 19/9
U6(0, 2, 2) = 13/9.
implying that (0, 0, 2) is the unique best response for voter 6.
Voter 7
The most probable pivot outcome faced by voter 7 is the event (6, 4, 4). Due
to her utility profile, voter 7 strictly prefers to use an undominated strategy and is
indifferent among all of them: that is (0, 0, 2), (0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 2). Hence, the mixed
strategy g7 is a best response.
The second step of the proof consists in showing that g is a perfect equilibrium.
To do so, consider the following completely mixed strategy combination gε, where
ηi denotes the mixed strategy of voter i which assigns equal probability to all his
pure strategies.
i = 1,2,3 gεi = (1− 27ε2)(2, 0, 0) + 27ε2ηi
i = 4,5 gεi = (1− 27ε2)(0, 2, 1) + 27ε2ηi
i = 6 gεi = (1− ε− 27ε2)(0, 0, 2) + ε(0, 1, 2) + 27ε2ηi,
i = 7 gεi = g7 + 27ε
2ηi.
It is easy to see that, for ε sufficiently close to zero, this is an ε-perfect equilib-
rium. Suppose all voters other than i choose the strategies prescribed by g. Since
for ε going to zero, the probability of voter 6 to tremble towards (0, 1, 2) is infinitely
greater than the probability of any other mistake, it is enough to check that the
limiting strategy is preferred to the other undominated strategy when either this
mistake or no mistake at all occurs.
For voters 1 to 5, the relevant contingency is the one described by the limiting
strategy g. Indeed, as has been shown, their unique best response is the one depicted
by g as when the trembles tends towards, they have a unique best response. For
voter 6, the same argument applies.
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Finally, one can deduce that for voter i = 7 casting the mixed strategy ballot
g7 is a best response, against g
ε. Indeed, for voter 7, the relevant contingency are
summarized by the vectors (6, 4, 4) and (6, 5, 4). Let us denote their probabilities
by p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i) and p((6, 6, 4) | f ε−i). Since
U7(0, 0, 2) = 3p((6, 4, 4) | f ε−i) + 3p((6, 5, 4) |f ε−i)
= U7(0, 1, 2), U7(0, 2, 2).
the mixed strategy g7 is a best reply to g
ε
−i.
Hence, {gε} is a sequence of ε-perfect equilibria. Since g is the limit of gε, it is
a perfect equilibrium in which voters’ best responses are not overstating.
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